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CASENOTE
TRADE REGULATION: The Federal Trade Commission
has the authority to order corrective advertising to dispel
the effects of past deception. Warner-Lambert Co. v.
FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
950 (1978).
In 1914, Congress passed the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act,'
which greatly expanded governmental control over interstate trade by pro-
viding for the prosecution of both unfair methods of competition and un-
fair or deceptive acts.2 The regulatory powers given the Commission
under the Act reach false and deceptive 3 advertising, and enable the FTC
to order the cessation of illegal advertising practices. 4 Although technically
1. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1976).
2. The FTC usually proceeds on a case by case basis in determining what is "decep-
tion." Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879, 897 (9th Cir. 1960) (the standard is the reasonable person
test, which assumes that many who might be misled are unsophisticated and unwary). See
also Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 120 F.2d 175 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 668 (1941)
(average individual is not likely to analyze complicated deferred credit plans carefully);
Benrus Watch Co., 64 F.T.C. 1018 (1964) (violation if 14% of the audience is misled). But
see In re Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282, 1290 (1963) (advertiser may not be charged with every
conceivable misconception when the ads may reach the foolish or feeble-minded).
Because the original Act proscribed only practices which injured competition, corpora-
tions could deceive consumers with impunity. In 1938, Congress amended the Federal
Trade Commission Act to allow the Commission to protect consumers. Wheeler-Lea Act,
Pub. L. No. 75-447, 52 Stat. 111 (1938). In 1975, the FTC jurisdiction was expanded even
further to correct consumer abuses. Magnuson-Moss Warranty: the Federal Trade Com-
mission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (1976) (FTC jurisdiction expanded to include
those persons or entities affecting commerce as well as those in commerce).
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1976) "The Commission is empowered and directed to
prevent persons, partnerships or corporations. . . from using unfair methods of competition
in commerce and unfair or deceptive practices in commerce." See Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540
F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1976) (FTC has authority to prohibit conduct that, although legally
proper, is unfair to the public); see also FTC v. Sperry-Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239
(1972) (FTC may define and proscribe an unfair competitive practice even though the prac-
tice does not infringe the letter or the spirit of the antitrust laws).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1976) provides:
If. . . the Commission shall be of the opinion that the method of competition or
the act or practice in question is prohibited by [this Act]. . . , it shall make a report
in writing in which it shall state its findings as to the facts and shall issue. . . an
order requiring . . . [that] person, partnership or corporation to cease and desist
from using such unfair method of competition or such act or practice.
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limited by statute to issuing cease and desist orders, the FTC has wide
discretion in fashioning remedies that comport with the statutory man-
date.5 Accordingly, in certain cases the Commission has ordered affirma-
tive disclosure,6 forcing an advertiser to qualify a claim held to be
deceptive. 7  Recently, in Warner-Lambert Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission,8 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit increased the arsenal of agency remedies when it concluded
that the FTC could compel corrective advertising 9 to dispel the effect of
past illegal practices, even when future advertisements did not neccessarily
Subsequent to the cease and desist order, continued false advertising of the same type re-
garding the same category of products results in penalties of $10,000 per day per violation.
15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(I) (Supp. IV 1974) as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (1976).
5. Generally, the courts will not interfere with an FTC order unless the remedy does
not rationally relate to the violation. See FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952);
Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 613 (1946); William H. Rorer, Inc. v. FTC, 374 F.2d
622, 627 (2d Cir. 1967); Joseph A. Kaplan & Sons, Inc. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 785, 789 (D.C. Cir.
1965). But see REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE,
H.R. REP. No. 533, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1914) (FTC has no power to regulate produc-
tion).
6. Before affirmative disclosure may be ordered, the FTC must ftmd that the failure to
make an affirmative statement is misleading because of the claims made in the advertise-
ment, or because of the consequences from the use of the product. Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d
36, 39 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 818 (1950). Accord, Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879, 899
(9th Cir. 1960); Ward Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d 952, 955 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 827 (1960); Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 18, 23 (5th Cir.
1960).
7. See, e.g., Royal Baking Powder Co. v. FTC, 281 F. 744 (2d Cir. 1922) (order to
affirmatively disclose that baking powder was now made from phosphate, since consumers
may have bought the product because it once was produced from cream of tartar).
8. 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978).
9. Gerald J. Thain, former Assistant Director for National Advertising of the FTC
Bureau of Consumer Protection, has described corrective advertising as an order which
corrects misimpressions caused by past advertising, even if current advertising for
the product is completely truthful. Corrective advertising is thus designed to de-
prive false advertisers of the fruits of their. . . past deception. While such attempts
to restore competitive conditions to the status quo ante may seem novel as applied
to false advertising matters, the same principle is the basis for the remedy of divest-
iture, which the Commission has used for several years to fashion relief in antitrust
cases involving mergers and monopolies.
Thain, Advertising Regulation: The Contemporary FTC Approach, I FORDHAM URB. L.J.
349, 353 (1973). For a discussion and explanation of the remedy of corrective advertising
see ROTHSCHILD AND CARROLL, CONSUMER PROTECTION REPORTING SERVICE, § 3.16
(1973); Anderson & Winer, Corrective Advertising The FTC's New Formula for Effective
Relief, 50 TEX. L. REv. 312 (1972); Lemke, Souped- Up Affirmative Disclosure Orders of the
Federal Trade Commission, 4 U. MICH. J. LEGIS. REF. 180 (1971); Note, Corrective Advertis-
ing-The New Response to Consumer Deception, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 415 (1972); Note, The
Limits of fTC Power to Issue Consumer Protection Orders, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 496
(1972); Note, Corrective Advertising and the FTC: No Virginia, Wonder Bread Doesn't Help
Build Strong Bodies Twelve Ways, 70 MICH. L. Rnv. 374 (1971).
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mislead the consumer. 10
The FTC issued a complaint against the Warner-Lambert Corporation
in 1972" charging that the company's advertisements for its mouthwash,
Listerine,12 were false and deceptive in violation of section 5(a)(1) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act.' 3 After concluding that the representa-
tions made were false, 14 the FTC ordered Warner-Lambert to include in
its future Listerine advertising a statement that the product would not help
prevent colds or sore throats or even lessen their severity.' 5 Claiming the
authority to order the relief necessary to protect the public from the effects
10. 562 F.2d at 760-61. The Commission has also imposed a number of corrective
advertising orders with the consent of the violator. See, e.g., In re Sugar Information, Inc.,
81 F.T.C. 711 (1972); In re Medi-Hair Int'l., 80 F.T.C. 627 (1972); In re Ocean Spray Cran-
berries, Inc., 80 F.T.C. 975 (1972); In re Rickles, 79 F.T.C. 513 (1971).
The FTC has developed two types of corrective orders. Most require the advertiser to
explain or repudiate schemes that have been held to be deceptive. See ITT Continental
Baking Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,681 (1971) (order
requiring producer of Profile Bread to apportion 25% of future advertising funds to inform-
ing the public that the product is ineffective for weight reduction). The Commission has
also ordered violators to inform or confess to the public that the FTC has found its advertis-
ing to be deceptive or unfair in violation of the Act. See Coca-Cola Co., [1970-1973 Trans-
fer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,351 (1970) (proposed order requiring the
advertiser to state that the Commission has alleged false advertising; case dismissed for fail-
ure to prove deception).
11. In 1940, the FTC issued the same complaint but dismissed the action without
prejudice. Commissioner March found insufficient evidence to conclude that Warner-Lam-
bert's tests which demonstrated Listerine to be an effective cold fighter, were incorrect. See
Lambert Pharmaceutical Co., 38 F.T.C. 726, 749 (1944).
12. The complaint alleged that Warner-Lambert had misrepresented that Listerine
would cure, prevent, or alleviate sore throats and the common cold. In re Warner-Lambert
Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398, 1486-87 (1975). For text of the advertisements, see id at 1403-04.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976).
14. The FTC based its conclusion on six separate findings: First, the ingredients were
not present in sufficient quantities to have any therapeutic effect; second, the procedure for
using the mouthwash (gargling) is ineffective for transporting the mouthwash to critical ar-
eas of the body; third, even if the mouthwash were to reach critical areas, it would be impo-
tent because it could not penetrate the tissue cells; fourth, clinical studies showing the
mouthwash to be effective were unreliable; fifth, Listerine kills millions of germs, but germs
do not cause colds, and the mouthwash also leaves millions of germs in the mouth; and sixth,
Listerine has no more effect on the symptoms of a sore throat than has gargling with salt
water. Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749, 753-54 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
15. The cease and desist order was three-pronged. First, Warner-Lambert was ordered
to abandon all advertising campaigns stating that Listerine would cure colds and sore
throats. Second, the order was applied to the claim that Listerine is a treatment for the
symptoms of colds and sore throats. Third, the FTC ordered Warner-Lambert to cease and
desist from advertising Listerine unless the advertisement contained the statement: "Con-
trary to prior advertising, Listerine will not help or prevent colds or sore throats or lessen
their severity." Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398, 1514 (1975). The corrective advertis-
ing aspect of the order was made applicable to the next ten million dollars of Listerine
advertising. This represented an amount equal to the average annual Listerine advertising
budget from April 1962 to March 1972. 562 F.2d at 752, n.1.
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of a violation, the FTC reasoned that corrective advertising is required
when a lengthy deceptive advertising campaign creates a false belief that
consumers will remember, even after the misrepresentation has ended.'
6
Although it upheld the FTC's authority to order corrective advertising,
the court of appeals modified the Commission's order.' 7 Finding substan-
tial evidence' s in the record to conclude that the advertisements were de-
ceptive, the court held that the FTC had the power to impose corrective
advertising,' 9 and that such a remedy was not precluded by the legislative
history behind the Federal Trade Commission Act. 20 Acknowledging the
16. Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398, 1499 (1975). Warner-Lambert commenced
Listerine advertising containing the claims in 1921. 562 F.2d at 749, 752. The FTC found
that a study conducted by Warner-Lambert, combined with expert opinions, proved that a
majority of the consumers questioned retained the deceptive beliefs from Listerine and that
the retention rate would remain high for at least five years. Id at 762-63 n.65.
17. The original order read: "Contrary to prior advertising, Listerine will not help pre-
vent colds or sore throats or lessen their severity." Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d
at 763. The court, however, deleted the opening clause and hinted that such a preface might
be an appropriate humiliation in an egregious case. Id
18. Generally an agency's findings will be upheld if they are supported by substantial
evidence on the record viewed as a whole. See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474 (1951).
19. 562 F.2d at 756. Warner-Lambert contended that corrective advertising orders im-
pinge upon the first amendment right to freedom of speech. The court disagreed, emphasiz-
ing that the first amendment is not a barrier to government regulation of deceptive
advertising. Id at 758. See id at 768-71 (supplemental opinion on petition for rehearing of
first amendment issue). See also Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (state
can insure clean and free flow of information); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (statutory bans on advertising pre-
scription drug prices violate the first amendment); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)
(commercial speech is protected by the first amendment). But see G. ROSDEN & P. Ros-
DEN, I THE LAW OF ADVERTISING, 9-43 (1977) (corrective advertising violates the doctrine
against prior restraint).
20. 562 F.2d 749, 758. The court stated that the difference between corrective advertis-
ing and affirmative disclosure is one of verbiage which has no legal import:
The nature of the violation, and the nature of the remedy required, are no different
whether one says that future truthful ads will be "deceptive" when viewed against
the backdrop of earlier advertising, or that future sales to customers who have
been misled by earlier advertising will constitute the deceptive practice [affirmative
disclosure], or,. . . that 'there is clear and continuing injury to competition and to
the consuming public as consumers continue to make purchasing decisions based
on the false belief [that arose from prior deceptive advertisements]' [corrective ad-
vertising].
d at 761 n.59 (citing JA 894). The Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975,
88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (1976)), which authorizes the FTC to
bring suits in federal court to redress injury by "recission or reformation of contracts, the
refund of money or return of property, the payment of damages, and public notification
respecting the rule violation or the unfair or deceptive act or practice." Id The court dis-
missed Warner-Lambert's argument that this section is a grant to a court of power to order
notification establishing that the Commission itself does not have the power to order public
disclosure. 562 F.2d at 757. Noting that Congress specifically provided that the amend-
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lengthy time lapse2' between the complaint and the appealed decision, the
court concluded that modem methods of advertising have extracted the
teeth from the cease and desist order.22 Therefore, after positing standards
for the imposition of a corrective advertising remedy, the court upheld the
FTC's choice. 23 In his dissent, however, Judge Robb asserted that the
legislative history of the Act and its amendments indicated that Congress
never intended for the FTC to have the power to order corrective advertis-
ing.24 Since the Commission's power to issue a cease and desist order is
statutorily limited to the prevention of future illegal acts, he maintained
that corrective advertising, insofar as it attempts to alleviate the effects of
past deception, is not permissible.
25
I. EXPANSION OF THE FTC's CEASE AND DESIST POWER
Section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act was intended to stop
unfair methods of competition before competitors and the public could be
injured.26 The courts initially confined FTC remedies to comport with a
strict reading of section five, concluding that the Commission was not em-
powered to act as a court of equity.27 Thus, early FTC remedies prohib-
ited only those competitive methods used by business to gain an unfair
ments should not be construed to affect any authority of the Commission under any other
law, the court concluded that the legislative history did not remove corrective advertising
from the class of permissible remedies. Id at 758. See CONF. REP. No. 93-1408, 93d
CONG., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7774.
21. See Note, Corrective Advertising Orders of the Federal Trade Commission, 85 HARV.
L. REv. 477, 482-83 (1971) (3-5 year delay is common from complaint to final order).
22. Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d at 761-62 & n.60. When a simple cease and
desist order is the sole method of enforcing violations, advertisers have nothing to lose but
attorney's fees. This often leads to extended litigation and appeals. Moreover, the adver-
tiser is able to employ the deceptive practice to its economic advantage until the order is
final.
23. The court delineated a two-step test for determining whether corrective advertising
is an appropriate remedy. First, did the advertisement play a substantial role in creating or
reinforcing a false belief about the product? And second, will this belief be retained after the
cessation of the deceptive advertisement? Id at 762.
24. Id at 765-66 (Robb, J., dissenting).
25. Id at 764, 768. Theorizing that in the case of corrective advertising there will be
nothing to correct in the text of the advertisement after compliance with the cease and desist
order, Judge Robb concluded that the order in this case was unlike permissible affirmative
disclosure orders which were utilized when advertisers would use copy in future advertising
that was similar to the deceptive ads. Id at 768.
26. See 51 CONG. REC. 11455 (1914) (Remarks of Senator Cummins, Chairman of the
Senate Foreign and Interstate Commerce Committee); FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643
(1931).
27. See, e.g., FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1926) (Commission has no
authority to require that a company divest itself of the ownership of businesses which it
acquired prior to action by the FTC).
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advantage. 28 FTC authority subsequently was expanded to include con-
sumer protection in 1938.29 In light of the congressional intent to protect
both consumers and competing businesses, courts gradually sanctioned ex-
panded Commission authority to regulate other practices within its pur-
view.30 Since the FTC had the statutory authority to deal with myriad
deceptive acts, 31 the courts permitted broader cease and desist orders.
32
Because protection of competitors and the public provided the touch-
stone for the cease and desist order, the FTC viewed its role as prophylac-
tic.33 Accordingly, in order to prevent future deception, the Commission
enlarged the scope of its orders to include all aspects of a violator's opera-
tions.34 Similarly, orders were allowed to reach not only the particular de-
ceptive act and advertising scheme employed by the violator, but all
variations that could be used in the future.
3 5
28. Id.
29. See the Wheeler-Lea amendments, note 2 supra.
30. See, e.g., FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966) (FTC has authority to seek
injunctive relief from courts under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970)). Cf. Pan
American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963) (CAB has broad cease
and desist power).
31. See FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966).
32. See Johnson Products Co. v. FTC, 549 F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1977) (valid cease and
desist order even though violations charged in the complaint relate to less than all of the
respondent's products); Niresk Indus. Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 337 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 883 (1960) (FTC order prohibiting company from using deceptive practice applies to all
products company sells).
33. See Spiegel Inc. v. FTC, 494 F.2d 59, 62 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1974)
(proof of actual injury is unnecessary to support a cease and desist order).
34. See note 32 supra.
35. See FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965) (use of three different tele-
vision commercials employing the same deceptive practices is sufficient basis to frame cease
and desist order broadly enough to prevent similar illegal practices in the future); Erickson
v. FTC, 272 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 940 (1960) (order prohibiting
manufacturer of scalp treatment from making representations that the preparation could
arrest baldness in connection with that particular preparation or any other preparation for
use in treatment of hair was not too broad); Consumer Sales Corp. v. FTC, 198 F.2d 404 (2d
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 912 (1953) (order prohibiting use of advertising scheme in
which box tops were exchanged for "discount" merchandise not overbroad when the prac-
tice had been discontinued, if the FTC determines that it is necessary to prevent the revival
of the deceptive practice).
The Commission employed the terms "deceptive" and "unfair" as criteria for cease and
desist orders, first developing its power under deceptive practices to include excision of trade
names that misrepresented products. See FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1933);
FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212 (1933). More recently, the FTC has sought to
prevent unfair practices which are not deceptive. See FTC v. Sperry-Hutchinson Co., 405
U.S. 233 (1972); FTC v. Mandel Bros. Inc., 359 U.S. 385 (1959); FTC v. National Lead Co.,
352 U.S. 419 (1957); L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1971). For a discussion
on the distinction between the development of regulation of unfair and deceptive acts, see
Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation oAdvertising, 90 Harv. L.
Rev. 661, 665, 680 (1977). The FTC also has ordered businesses to perform acts that nor-
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Nonetheless, the courts have limited the scope of cease and desist orders
on numerous occasions. In Albery v. FTC 36 the District of Columbia
Circuit held that the Commission could require only that a product be
truthfully represented. In Alberty, the FTC found that a pharmaceutical,
advertised as having an overall therapeutic effect on blood, had no benefi-
cial impact except in the case of simple iron deficiency anemia.37 In addi-
tion to ordering the standard cease and desist remedy, the FTC mandated
that future advertisements include information on the causes of lassitude
and the product's effect on those conditions. 38 This affirmative disclosure
order was excised on appeal, and the court concluded that the FTC could
not mandate additional negative statements except when representations
required further explanation, or when the consequences of using a product
required a warning.39 The court did not recognize any relation between a
derogatory addendum to an advertisement and the purpose of preventing
deception.40 Indeed, the Alberty court emphasized that the purpose of the
FTC Act was to prevent falsity, not to encourage informative advertis-
ing.41 The court added that since the Commission's role was to prevent
deception, the blanket power to order derogatory disclosures would effec-
tively transfer market control to the FTC, which could, in its discretion,
require a particular advertiser to state precisely the limited benefits of its
product and inform consumers exactly what the product will not do.42
mally would have been within the discretion of management. See Charles Pfizer & Co. v.
FTC, 401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920 (1969); Luria Bros. & Co., Inc.
v. FTC, 389 F.2d 847 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 829 (1968). Courts, however, have
refused to enforce FTC orders which usurp the freedom of management to make those deci-
sions which plot the course of the company, because such orders are considered an unwar-
ranted infringement on free enterprise. See generally Zenith Radio Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d
29 (7th Cir. 1944); N. Fluegelman & Co., Inc. v. FTC, 37 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1930).
36. 182 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 818 (1950).
37. 1d at 37. The typical advertisement read: "When you are weary, tired, run down,
just dragging yourself around with no ambition left, when every effort you make seems to
leave you weak and spent then try Oxoris Tablets, a tonic for the blood." Id
38. The Commission ordered the defendant to disclose affirmatively "that the condition
of lassitude is caused less frequently by simple iron deficiency anemia than by other causes
and that in such cases the preparation will not be effective in relieving or correcting it." Id
39. See note 6 supra.
40. 182 F.2d at 39. The court theorized that "Almost every advertisement of food, drug
or drink, no matter how accurately described and carefully limited in claims" would be
subject to affirmative disclosure of its particular shortcomings if the Commission's rule were
allowed to stand. Id
41. Id The court characterized the purpose of the FTC Act as a negative restriction on
falsity which has little to do with the affirmative task of encouraging properly informative
ads.
42. Courts have ignored the language in A1berty which proscribes affirmative disclo-
sures. Instead, the A/lberty holding is rationalized as requiring a finding that failure to make
disclosures is deceptive before the FTC can mandate that derogatory statements be placed in
19781
Catholic University Law Review
Affirmative disclosure orders have been upheld, however, where there
was a need to prevent future deception inherent in the advertising
scheme.43 In Waltham Watch Co. v. FTC,44 the Commission ordered a
successor to the original Waltham Watch Company to disclose that its im-
ported clocks, sold under the trade name "Waltham," were not made by
the original, well known domestic watch manufacturer.45 Upholding the
order, the court apparently reasoned that any clock advertisement by the
new corporation bearing the trade name "Waltham," would be inherently
deceptive unless it contained the affirmative disclosure that the original
company no longer manufactured clocks.46 Asserting that the congres-
sional objective of prohibiting deception would be frustrated if the FTC
could not order disclosure, the Seventh Circuit sanctioned the Commis-
sion's use of discretion in formulating such orders.47 The court implied
that even an arsenal of remedies would permit advertisers to find another
means or scheme of deception if they lacked affirmative disclosure or-
ders.
48
Since Waltham, the FTC has enlarged the scope of its affirmative dis-
closure power still further by requiring advertisers to state on occasion that
advertisements. See, e.g., Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1960); Keele Hair & Scalp
Specialists, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1960). See also note 6 supra.
43. See, e.g., Haskelite Mfg. Corp. v. FTC, 127 F.2d 765 (7th Cir. 1942) (order requir-
ing disclosure that trays which have simulated wood surfaces are actually covered with pa-
per).
The FTC has also required affirmative disclosure if purchasers have incorrect beliefs con-
cerning the nature of a product in the absence of disclosure. See Mohawk Rfg. Co. v. FTC,
263 F.2d 818 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 814, (1959) (order to disclose oil sold at service
stations was recycled from crank-case oil because customer assumed that it was manufac-
tured from pure crude oil); Mary Muffet, Inc. v. FTC, 194 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1952) (order to
include fabric composition in clothing labels because consumer assumed that rayon clothing
was made from silk); Segal v. FTC, 142 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1944) (per curiam) (order to
disclose that lenses were made in Japan because consumers assume that unmarked goods are
American made).
44. 318 F.2d 28 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 944 (1963).
45. Id at 31. The original Waltham Watch Co. was located in Waltham, Massachu-
setts and was founded in 1849. Before 1957, the company ceased manufacturing clocks, and
during that year a Delaware corporation with the same name was organized as a "spin-off'
of the original. The new corporation had acquired all of the goodwill of the old Waltham
Watch Co. In 1959, the new company contracted with a corporation to have clocks im-
ported from West Germany, and devised an advertising campaign which attempted to sell
the imported clocks as a product of the old company. Id at 29-31.
46. Id at 31.
47. "If the Commission is to attain the objectives Congress envisioned, it cannot be
required to confine its road block to the narrow lane the transgressor has traveled; it must be
allowed effectively to close all roads to the prohibited goal, so that its order may not be
bypassed with impunity." FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952), quoted in 318
F.2d at 32.
48. 318 F.2d at 32.
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a product or device does not achieve results.49  Despite this expansion,
courts have warned the FTC to exercise caution in mandating the affirma-
tive disclosure of a negative statement that lists all functions a product is
unable to perform. 50 Such orders, however, have been approved if the
advertisement is deceptive due to the omission of facts which are material
in light of the representations made in the copy.5 1 Deception in the adver-
tisement itself also has been a basis for affirmative disclosure, even if fu-
ture advertisements would be truthful. 52 Thus, according to the particular
circumstance of the violation, the FTC currently can impose the affirma-
tive disclosure remedy in many situations dealing with admissions, omis-
sions, and both positive and negative disclosures.
53
49. See J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967). In Williams, the FTC
ordered the manufacturers of Geritol, a medication intended to cure tiredness, to disclose
that the product would not be effective in cases in which the anemia is caused by factors
other than a vitamin or iron deficiency, and that iron deficiency anemia is not the cause of
tiredness in a great majority of cases. Id at 892. Concluding that the advertisement falsely
represented the efficiency of the product, the Sixth Circuit upheld the order. Id. at 890.
The Williams court noted that the order did not amount to negative advertising, and charac-
terized the remedy as informative because "it merely presents to the consumer an opportu-
nity to make an intelligent choice." Id The court, therefore, concluded that in light of
misrepresentations concerning the product's efficiency, the order was necessary. See also
Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1960) (order requiring manufacturer of a bed-wetting
remedy to disclose that the product was effective only in cases of enuresis not caused by
organic diseases or defects); Ward Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d 952 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 827 (1960). (disclosure that baldness remedy effective in cases not of the
male pattern variety, after finding nearly all cases of baldness fall within the male pattern
category); Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1960) (affirma-
tive disclosure for baldness remedy).
50. See, e.g., Ward Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d at 954. "Merely because a
remedy is useful for only one ailment is no reason to demand an accompanying statement of
all the ills for which it is not beneficial." Id
51. Id But see FTC v. Simeon Management Corp., 532 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1976) ("rea-
sonable belief" that viewers are misled is insufficient to constitute prope showing for an
injunction).
52. See Royal Baking Powder Co. v. FTC, 281 F. 744 (2nd Cir. 1922) (truthful ads were
still deceptive because they did not advise consumers that their reasons for buying the com-
pany's baking powder in the past no longer applied); All-State Indus. of N.C., Inc., 75
F.T.C. 465 (1969), afid, 423 F.2d 423 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970) (requiring
disclosure by creditors that instruments of indebtedness might be assigned to a third party
thereby resulting in a substantial alteration of the buyer's rights and liabilities).
53. See Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879, 897 (9th Cir. 1960). Congress has passed various
statutes which require disclosure on labels and in advertisements. The FTC has the author-
ity to enforce these statutes. See Truth in Lending Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat.
146, (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 to 1666j (1976)); Fair Packaging and Labeling Act of
1966, Pub. L. No. 89-755, 80 Stat. 1296, (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451 to 1461 (1976));
Textile Fiber Products Identification Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-897, 72 Stat. 1717, (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. §§ 70 to 70k (1976)); Fur Products Labeling Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-
110, 65 Stat. 175, (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 69 to 69j (1976)); Wood Products Labeling Act of
1939, Pub. L: No. 76-850, 54 Stat. 1128, (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68 to 68j (1976)).
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In spite of these developments, the imposition of these remedies involves
certain considerations. Generally, the Commission has broad discretion
to develop a solution as long as the remedy bears some reasonable relation
to the deceptive practice.54 Because courts have confined their review of
Commission decisions solely to an abuse of discretion, they have permitted
the FTC to insure cessation of deceptive practices by allowing it to frame
orders which reach all possible practices and schemes. 5 The general re-
quirement that the remedy reasonably relate to the violation acts as a guar-
antee against recurring deception, while it allows the FTC to ultilize its
expertise to develop orders that will bar further violations. In keeping
with the view that Congress intended the FTC to regulate all deception,
courts recognize the expertise of the Commission in fashioning a suitable
remedy. 56 But despite their deference, courts have continually placed up-
per limits on the scope of FTC remedies. For example, since the FTC's
role is strictly regulatory, the Commission's orders cannot impose criminal
or civil liability as punishment for section five violations. Thus, the FTC's
orders have related to present and future deception and not to past illegal
acts, since a remedy aimed at a past representation is regarded as compen-
satory in nature.57 Furthermore, it has been argued that because FTC
orders are not to be punitive, they should only prohibit current deceptive
54. See FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957); Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327
U.S. 608 (1946). But see ITT Continental Baking Co. v. FTC, 532 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1976)
(courts can narrow FTC orders by deleting those portions for which a reasonable relation-
ship to the offending conduct is found lacking). Earlier decisions struck down remedies if
less drastic means would accomplish the same results. See FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288
U.S. 212, 217 (1933) (excision of trade name should not be ordered unless there is no other
means to remedy deception).
55. See P.F. Collier & Son Corp. v. FTC, 427 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1970), cerl. denied, 400
U.S. 966 (1971) (FTC allowed to close all roads to the prohibited goal so that an order may
not be bypassed); but see Gold Tone Studios Inc. v. FTC, 183 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1950) (abuse
of discretion standard).
56. See Carter Prods. Inc. v. FTC, 268 F.2d 461, 498 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
884, reh. denied, 361 U.S. 921 (1959); Jacob Seigel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612-13 (1946).
Some commentators criticize the characterization of the FTC as an expert body:
Up to a point, the alleged expertise is a legal fiction: A commissioner, no matter
how erudite, does not become an expert by presidential appointment with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate, no more than a soldier becomes a gentleman by
virtue of being commissioned, although the commission itself so states.
ROSDEN & ROSDEN, supra note 19, at 9-36.
57. See P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1954). The Commission's power
does not enable it to mandate that businesses make monetary restitution for deception. See
Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1974) (ordering refunds to past consumers is different
from ordering affirmative disclosures to correct misconceptions future customers may hold).
Also, the FTC does not possess the power to close one of many businesses advertising decep-
tively in an industry. FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244 (1967), (citing Moog
Industries Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958)).
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practices and attempt to prevent their future occurrence. 58
II. CORRECTIVE ADVERTISING: "AND Now,
A WORD AGAINST OUR SPONSOR" 5 9
In the face of precedent confining Commission orders to future prac-
tices, the Warner-Lambert court allowed an order clearly aimed at cor-
recting the effects of past deception.60 Concluding that there is no
conceptual difference between affirmative disclosure and corrective adver-
tising, the Warner-Lambert court likened the order at issue to the remedy
devised in Waltham by stating that the reason for disclosure was identi-
cal.6 1 The District of Columbia Circuit asserted that in both cases the
cumulative impact of all prior deceptive advertising necessitated future
disclosure.62 Likewise, the court compared the purposes of the orders and
concluded that in both cases it would be deceptive and unfair to allow
consumers to continue to purchase the product based upon beliefs created
by past misrepresentations. 63 The nature of the Warner-Lambert order is
distinguishable, however, in that it attempts to correct past deception de-
spite the truthfulness of future advertising. Judge Robb, in his dissent, be-
lieved this distinction to be controlling. He concluded that Waltham-type
orders were designed to remedy inherently deceptive advertising by requir-
ing that the false representations be corrected in future schemes using simi-
lar copy.64 In contrast, he noted that Warner-Lambert-type orders, which
assume a totally truthful advertisement after the cease and desist order,
require a correction when there is nothing to correct. 65 Thus, Robb con-
cluded that the orders cut against precedent by seeking to correct past de-
ception.
In contrast to the conceptual problems posed by the majority's attempt
to reconcile corrective advertising with affirmative disclosure, the FTC has
adopted a more clearcut approach. Rather than viewing corrective adver-
tising as a remedy aimed at past deceit, the FTC maintains that the orders
effectuate section five purposes because the lingering effects attending de-
ceptive advertisements are themselves violations that can be prohibited.
66
58. See New Standard Pub. Co. v. FTC, 194 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1952).
59. See Comment, And Now A WordAgainst Our Sponsor. Extending the FCC's Fairness
Doctrine to Advertising, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1416 (1972).
60. Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See also Note,
supra note 21, at 491.
61. 562 F.2d 749 at 761.
62. Id
63. Id
64. Id at 768.
65. Id
66. Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398 (1975); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81
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Thus, when the basis for corrective advertising is viewed as a remedy for a
future violation, there is no precedential problem. The Warner-Lambert
court recognized the Commission's theory when it asserted that both future
deceptive ads viewed against earlier advertising and future sales to con-
sumers who have been misled by past deceptive schemes are violations.67
Its subsequent rejection, however, of the Commission's theory in favor of
the thesis blending affirmative disclosure and corrective advertising reme-
dies is unwarranted and creates serious problems in the subsequent appli-
cation of either alternative.
Although the D.C. Circuit concluded that the Warner-Lambert remedy
is identical to the order sanctioned in Waltham,68 the court decreed that
corrective advertising would require a different justification than affirma-
tive disclosure. The touchstone for imposing a corrective remedy is
whether the false scheme will leave lingering deceptive beliefs after the
advertising ceases.69 The retained beliefs requirement differs from the af-
firmative disclosure test announced in Alberty.70 The Warner-Lambert
test, in effect, requires that there be a showing of retained false beliefs, the
proof of which can be singularly difficult.7' In addition, a remedy aimed
at the after-effects of deceptive advertising may extend far beyond FTC
regulatory authority, because the purpose of such an order would have the
effect of punishing the advertiser for past wrongful conduct.72
On its face, the type of remedy used in corrective advertising seems to
cut against court directives proscribing compensatory and punitive FTC
orders.73 Corrective advertising has been categorized as commercial hara-
kir because it results in a loss of market share for the violator.74  How-
F.T.C. 398 (1972) (corrective advertising order is not retrospective if its purpose and effect is
to terminate continuing injury to the public). The distinction between the actual act or prac-
tice and the residual effect of the prior act or practice is not clear-cut because deception does
not stop when the advertising campaign ceases. Thus, truthful ads have the ability to
deceive by simulating a latent image of the product which remains misrepresented, or by
reinforcing consumer habits that were wrongfully induced. See Note, supra note 21, at 493.
67. 562 F.2d at 761 n.59.
68. Id at 761. See notes 43-48 and accompanying text supra.
69. Id at 762. Warner-Lambert sanctioned the FTC's determination of the criteria for
imposition of corrective advertising. The court concluded that the requirement reasonably
related to the particular deception sought to be remedied. Id at 762.
70. See note 6 supra.
71. 562 F.2d at 768. In his dissent, Judge Robb rejected this expansion which "goes far
beyond the prevention of "illegal practices in the future" because the test would apply to
almost any advertisement which, is the subject of a cease and desist order. He concluded
that such an extension must be left up to Congress. Id
72. Id at 764.
73. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.




ever, if there is a finding, as in Warner-Lambert, that there are residual
effects from deceptive advertisements, the corrective remedy seems war-
ranted in light of the congressional mandate to correct all deception.
75
Thus, the need to accommodate competing policies through formulated
guidelines is readily apparent. In discussing the specific order involved,
however, the Warner-Lambert court does little to define its standards.
The court gave little deference to the fact that a corrective advertising or-
der may be overinclusive and thus not reasonably related to the violation
when applied to a totally different advertising scheme for the same prod-
uct.76 Indeed, in this situation, a corrective advertising order would have
more compensatory than regulatory effect. Given the need for more de-
finitive standards, the court should have delineated those circumstances in
which a corrective remedy would be appropriate and required a reason-
able relation between the future advertising and the retained deceptive be-
lief.
Nevertheless, the Warner-Lambert court had little difficulty imposing
the corrective order because the retained-effect test was easily satisfied by
a twenty-year advertisement.77 Warner-Lambert, however, seems to be a
rare case. Few advertising schemes are utilized for an equally long period
of time.78 Most advertising campaigns last no more than one year and
have considerably less retained effect than those lasting for a longer pe-
riod.79 Furthermore, in Warner-Lambert, there was a finding of retained
deceptive beliefs.80 It is very difficult to prove the nature and amount of
retained beliefs after an advertising scheme has ceased.8' Thus, the FTC
75. See note 3 supra.
76. This situation may occur, for example, if Warner-Lambert advertises its product
solely as a breath freshener.
77. The Commission found both creation of a false belief and retention of this deceptive
idea. See note 16 supra.
78. Warner-Lambert Co. has been holding Listerine out as a remedy for colds since
1921. Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749, 752.
79. Because retained effects are speculative, the subject matter retained is limited, and
the duration of the retention is proportionate to the time period of the scheme, some scholars
conclude that it is impossible to show a residual effect in advertisements of ordinary prod-
ucts which have a relatively short life span on the market. See ROSDEN & ROSDEN, supra
note 19, at 9-29, 9-31.
80. 562 F.2d at 762.
81. We do not believe that the residual effect will prove to be present for any
substantial period and with a significant percentage of prospective buyers. We say
that we do not believe that such lengthy effect can be shown, but we must admit
that we do not know. A scrutiny of surveys that have been made seems to show
that the conditions of the surveys were unreliable or not suited for thispurpose, and
that no surveys have been made that concentrate on. . . finding out whether and
how long people retain specific. . . claims in an advertisement. It follows that we
do not believe that the evidence that is necessary can be demonstrated.
ROSDEN & ROSDEN, supra note 19, at 9-41.
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may have to assume the existence of retained beliefs in order to impose
corrective advertising, and Warner-Lambert expressly sanctions this ap-
proach.82 By permitting the FTC to assume the existence of lingering ef-
fects, the court invents a fiction to reach an end or to correct a harm that
may not even exist.
Should the FTC assume the existence of retained deceptive ideas when,
in fact, they are not present, the sole purpose of the order would be reme-
dial, aimed at punishing past violators. Clearly such an order would ex-
ceed the Commission's powers. On the other hand, the presence of this
assumption may well serve as an effective deterrent to deceptive practices.
Prospective violators, who otherwise might successfully hide behind the
difficulties in proving retained effects, may reconsider employing decep-
tive schemes knowing that the assumption of lingering effects eases the
Commission's burden of proof. Yet despite this salutary effect, the ques-
tion of the Commission's power to invoke the corrective remedy still re-
mains.
III. CONCLUSION
Practically, a corrective advertising order may be the only method to
dispel beliefs which linger after the cessation of a deceptive advertising
violation. The problem with other remedies is one of delay.83 While
most advertising schemes are designed to run for one year or less, the FTC
procedure for investigation and prosecution typically drags on for years.
84
Thus, an advertiser can afford to employ deceptive practices until the cam-
paign is over and lose only attorney's fees. 85 Given the time delay, the
Commission cannot compete on an equal basis with the ingenuity and per-
suasiveness of large advertising campaigns.86 If the FTC follows the rea-
82. See note 9 supra. The court stated that it might be appropriate "in some cases to
presume the existence of. . . [creation of lingering false beliefs] for corrective advertising."
562 F.2d 762.
83. See Note, supra note 21, at 487 (corrective advertising has no effect on the fly-by-
night, one-shot advertiser).
84. See Pitofsky, supra note 35, at 693. See also Carter Prod., Inc. v. FTC, 268 F.2d
481 (9th Cir. 1959) (16 years of investigation and trial to compel company to drop reference
to "Liver" in "Carter's Little Liver Pills").
85. While the average FTC case endures for two years until final order, most advertis-
ing schemes last only a year. Although attorney's fees may be considerable, larger corpora-
tions would earn profits far exceeding attorney costs by employing the deceptive schemes.
Smaller businesses may not be able to take advantage of the impotency of FTC remedies
because they earn substantially lower profits and run considerably less advertising.
86. Inadequate remedies such as the cease and desist order allow violations of § 5 of the
FTC Act at will by deceptive advertisers. See Pitofsky, supra note 35, at 692. Since the
FTC budget permits few prosecutions, corrective advertising should be imposed as a deter-
rent. See REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FTC, 19-20 (1969) (Because of
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soning of Warner-Lambert in future cases, it can impose a corrective order
without having to prove that the public retains deceptive beliefs about the
product. Utilizing such a powerful remedy may be oppressive, however,
and the Commission must be careful to limit the scope of such orders
solely to eliminating retained beliefs.
Stephen M Silvestri
/
limitations on the FTC's budget, there were fewer than 500 investigations per year from
1965 to 1969).
In 1972, the FTC filed a statement with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
advocating, as an adjunct to the fairness doctrine, the adoption of a counter-commercial
program whereby "prime time" advertising would be made available to anyone who could
purchase it for the purpose of rebutting some of the controversial or special claims made by
commercial advertisers. The FTC also suggested that such time be made available even to
those who could not afford to purchase it. See 50 TEX. L. REV. 448 (1972). The FCC
refused to adopt this proposal. For the text of the proposal and discussion, see Scanlon, The
FTC, the FCC and the "Counter-Ad" Controversy.- An Invitation to "Let's You and Him
Fight?", 5 ANTITRUST L. & EcoN. REV. 43 (1971). For proponents' and critics' arguments,
see OPPENHEIM & WESTON, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES & CONSUMER PROTECTION CASES
AND COMMENTS, 617-18 n.14 (3d ed. 1974). See also note 59 supra.
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